Q41) The consumer will be indifferent between the two bundles if the utility derived under optimum situation is equal in bothe the cases.
Now consider case 1: the optimum demand bundles are x1=x2=M/(p1+p2)=M/3.
In case 2: M=px*X+py*Y,
or, M=1*X+(2-θ)*Y+T.
or, M-T=1*X+(2-θ)*Y.
The optimum bundles in this case is given by x1=x2=(M-T)/(1+(2-θ))=(M-T)/(3-θ).
Utilities will be equal implies, M/3=(M-T)/(3-θ)......................(a).
from (a) we can derive, θ=3T/M (option b).
Q42) The consumer will borrow in period 1 only if (1+r)<=1/β,
r<=(1/β)-1, option a cannot be the answer as r will depend on the value of β, same is with option b, option c also cannot be the answer as derived, option d is the answer as it lies in the defined set r<=(1/β)-1.
Q49)Use the concept that for any point which is Competitive equilibrium the monetary value of the excess demand will be zero..this leads to the condition that the market gets cleared, so competitive a competitive price ratio will clear the market...now the question remains how to find that price ratio..under the assumption that the preferences are monotone, complete and convex a Pareto efficient bundle leads to a competitive equilibrium (second theorem of welfare economics)..now we know that a Lexicographic preference ordering is monotone, complete and convex so a choose a Pareto Efficient point and compare..in this case the initial endowment bundle is Pareto efficient (you can check that too). This gives.
px*10+py*0=px*0+py*10.
or, px=py.
or, px/py=1.
So option b seems to be the only answer because option a may or may not be true because px=py is true but it may or may not be equal to 1. Option c and d cannot be true because px=py, so both px>py and py>px are false..so option c suits best.
"I don't ride side-saddle. I'm as straight as a submarine"