Doubts.

[deepasna.kalra]

Question 1. There are three bidders in an auction for a single object. Each individual
knows his own value for the object, but nobody knows anyone's value but
their own. The other bidders and the seller think of any bidder's value as
a random variable which is equally likely to be any amount between 0 and
$100. As it turns out, the actual values are as follows. Bidder 1 values the
object at $90, bidder 2 values it at $75 and bidder 3 values it at $45.
If the object is sold in an English auction and bidders all behave rationally,
approximately what price will the seller get for it?
a) $45
b) $32.5
c) $50
d) $75
Question 2.if the object is sold in a second price sealed bid auction and all bidders bid rationally, approximately what price will the seller get for it?
a) $45
b) $32.5
c) $50
d) $75

[deepasna.kalra]

Question 3.if the object is sold in the first price sealed bid auction and each bidder uses an equilibrium strategy, how much will each bidder bid? What price
does the seller receive for the object?
a) Each will bid 1/3 of his value. Seller will get $45
b) Each will bid 2/3 of his value. Seller will get $60
c) Each will bid 1/2 of his value. Seller will get $45
d) Cannot be determined

[deepasna.kalra]

please help

[kangkan]

is it 75 and 75?

[Arushi1]

Yep. Getting the same answers.

[deepasna.kalra]

can you please explain your approach

[deepasna.kalra]

okay got it thanks Arushi. also please help with the third question