|
Hello MR. For finding the PO allocations we can see immediately that the second person must be getting 0 of the first good. And the first good can be divided any way between the two people. Try to see that starting from any such allocation (and no other allocation), nobody's utility can be increased without making the other person's utility decrease.
As for the competitive equilibrium, we need two things-that agents observe prices and choose the utility maximizing bundles given their incomes at those prices, and that the market clears. Assume price of good 2 is 1 and price of first good is p. See that agent 2's income is 2p+6, and his demand is (0,2p+6). Now you know that for markets to clear, the first agent must demand the entire social endowment of good 1, i.e 12 units. Also, his income is 10p+2. Given his preferences, he would not demand any units of good 1 unless p=<1. So we know that p=<1 in any equilibrium. If p<1, he would buy only good 1. His demand would be 10p+2 units. Equating this to 12, we get p=1. Since this isn't <1, we rule out p<1. Next consider p=1. Now we need him to demand 12 units of good 1, i.e spend all of his income on it. But note that he wouldn't do that. Given his preferences, he would instead spend all his income on good 2. Hence there is no competitive equilibrium.
|