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The next TWO questions are based on the following situation: Consider
a two-person two-good exchange economy: persons/agents are A and B, and
goods are 1 and 2. The agents have the following utility functions:
uA(x;x2) =alpha x1 + x2; uB(y1; y2) = y1y2
where x1 and x2 denote the allocation to A of good 1 and good 2, respec-
tively. Similarly, y1 and y2 denote the allocation to B of good 1 and good
2, respectively. There are 5 units of each good; i.e., x1+y1 = 5 and x2+y2 = 5.
Now, consider the following allocation: Agent A gets 4 units of good 1
only, but agent B gets 1 unit of good 1 and 5 units of good 2.
QUESTION 34. Suppose an agent i is said to envy agent j, if i strictly
prefers j's allocation over her own allocation. And, an allocation is called
`No-envy allocation' if none of the agents envies the other. In that case,
(a) the above allocation is always `No-envy allocation'
(b) the above allocation is never `No-envy allocation'
(c) the above allocation is `No-envy allocation' if alpha>= 5/3
(d) the above allocation is `No-envy allocation' if alpha<=5/3
QUESTION 35. The above allocation is
(a) always Pareto optimal
(b) never Pareto optimal
(c) Pareto optimal if alpha<= 5
(d) Pareto optimal if alpha>= 5
i need the second one only,,,,q35...i m getting( a )
but answer key says (d)
plz help...amit sir...pls pls pls
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