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consider a competitive exchange economy with 2 agents( 1 and 20 and 2 goods (Xand Y)
endowments of agent 1 and2 are (100,100) and (50,0) respectively. an allocation for agent i is denoted by (xi, yi) where xi is his allocation of X and yi is his allocation of Y. agent 1's objective is to choose(x1,y1) to max is U min (x1.y1) agent2's objective is to choose (x2,y2) to maximise his u= x2+y2 Q3. an example of a pair of competitive equilib prices(p1,p2) for this economy is a) (1,0) b) (0,1) c) (1/3,2/3) d) (2/3,1/3) u have given the answer as c)(1/3, 2/3) option d) i can eliminate because there is excess supply of good x at these prices please explain how do we solve for the prices. |
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DSE 2005 1, 2, 3, 4
U1 = min{x1,y1} So the demand function for agent 1 is as follows X1 = y1 = m1 / px + py U2 = x2 + y2 So the demand function for agent 2 is X2= m2 / px if px<py = 0 if px> py = [0, m2/px] if px=py Now from the endowments we can calculate the income of two agents M1= 100 px + 100 py M2= 50 px So we take px=1 as numeraire price then M1 = 100 + 100py M2 = 50 This implies (by substituting above two equations in demand function) X1 = y1 = (100 +100py) / 1 + py = 100 And x2 = 50 and y = 0 (from initial endowment) This will be competitive equilibrium Clearly none of the prices could be 0 in equilibrium because it will become a free good and the markets will not clear. Therefore we have positive prices such that px < py because x and y are substitutes and y2 = 0 .at px > py , x2 = 0 but x1 = 100 therefore markets do not clear as there is excess supply , we eliminate this case. Now answers are 1 – d as shown above 2 – a because in other 3 cases if we take some amount of x ( in option b and c) from agent 1 and give to agent 2 then utility of agent 2 can be increased without any change in agent 1’s utility , hence we can make agent 2 better off without making agent 1 worse off and in option d some units if taken from 1 and given to 2 can give higher utility to agent 2 without making agent 1 worse off 3 – c a and b has either price 0 which cannot be the case because if py=0 then it will be a free good and there will be excess demand for y and the market will not clear, If px=0 then the income of second agent will become 0 and he will demand nothing of y and infinity of x(x is a free good now) at these prices so this cannot be the case and if px > py which implies x2 = 0 which cannot be the case. Therefore answer is c 4 – b m1 = 100 px +100 py –50 m2 = 50 px + 50 at px = ½ and py = ½ m1 = 50 m2 = 75 Substituting in demand functions we get X1 = y1 = 50 And X2 =100 y2 =50 (from endowment) |
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Lovely explanation Vishruti, even I was confused in this question. Thanks!!!
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