jnu mphil questions..

Posted by shelly gupta on Apr 26, 2014; 1:08am
URL: http://discussion-forum.276.s1.nabble.com/jnu-mphil-questions-tp7587819.html

Q1. Suppose in a set of 4 alternatives {x, y z, u4, x and y are Pareto-optimal while z and w
are not. From this we can infer that
(a) x is Pareto-superior to z
(b) x is Pareto-superior to w
(c) x is Pareto-superior to both z and w
(d) None of the above



Q2. For the next two questions,, consider the following :

There are two individuals, 1 and 2. Each individual has an initial endowment of 30. There is a
machine with the following property : Should individuals 1 and 2 provide respectively
endowments xi and x2 to the machine, the machine first computes the aggregate contribution,
xi + x2. This done, the machine responds by providing each of the individuals fresh
endowments equal to 5(x1 + x2)1/2. Thus the utility of individual i from the contribution profile
(x1, x2) is Ui (x1, x2) = 5(x1 + x2)1/2 + (30 - xi ). Note also that the endowment given to the
machine by individual i, xi, cannot exceed her initial endowment of 30.


Q.  Which of the following contribution profiles (x1, x2) maximizes the sum of the utilities of
the two individuals, U1(x1, x2)+U2(x1, x2)?
(a) (30, 30)
(b) (15, 15)
(c) (0, 25)
(d) None of the above

Q.  Suppose the individuals make their respective contributions, xl and x2,
simultaneously. This means that when an individual chooses her contribution level, she
is unaware of the contribution level chosen by the other person. For this
simultaneous-move game, which of the following contribution profiles constitute a Nash
equilibrium?
(a) (15, 15)
(b) (0, 25)
(c) (25/8, 25/8)
(d) None of the above