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Hi..i have series 1...i have doubts in these questions....
5. for a system of equation Ax=b qith m eqn and n variables where m>n and b is a given vctor,the following is true 26. If AB+BA= 0 square matix..i am getting none of these i am getting A^2 * B^3=B^2*A^2 50.the hawk dove enter non enter game theory question..what are the payoffs...i cant understand the representation :( Thanks :) |
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For question 26)
AB= -BA A^2B^3 = AABBB Now keep replacing AB with -BA until you receive a positive matrix.. like A(-BA)BB = -ABABB. Now again replace AB with -BA. Answer is coming a) |
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thanks
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In reply to this post by kangkan
first u understand the underlying meaning of Hawk & Dove....if Hawk then it threats and Dove then accommodating...now think abt it
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Mrittik..i know that bt how to proceed with it...can u elaborate
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Hi Ron...its like the chicken game....if the monopolist eliminates the possibilty of him.playing dove,,the new entrant will rationally choose to stay out...if he knows that the dove option exist with the incumbent, he will enter cuz once he enters,the incumbent will rationally choose to play dove :)
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plz help with q 33,34.thanks :)
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q33. 0.5*0.5 + 0.5*0.5 + 0.5*0.5 = 0.75.....
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In reply to this post by kangkan
Please help with Q 36 and 40..
http://economicsentrance.weebly.com/uploads/1/1/0/5/1105777/2011-option-a.pdf |
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Let us restrict our attention to the strategies of the following nature:
He choose two cutoff points m(1) for the first test and m(2) for the second test and his policy will be to accept the first score if its greater than m(1) and reject otherwise, and to accept the second score if its greater than m(2) and reject otherwise. Clearly, the choice variables are m(1) and m(2). We will find these m(1) and m(2) so that the student maximize the expected score in the exam. Expected score from policy (m(1), m(2)) is, Expected Score (m(1), m(2)) = Pr(his first score is less than m(1)) Expected Score (m(1), m(2)| his first score is less than m(1)) + Pr(his first score is greater than m(1)) Expected Score (m(1), m(2)| his first score is greater than m(1)) Since the distribution is uniform, Pr(his first score is less than m(1)) = m(1)/100 Pr(his first score is greater than m(1)) = (100-m(1))/100 Expected Score (m(1), m(2)| his first score is greater than m(1))= ∫x (1/(100-m(1)))dx with limit of the integral ranging from m(1) to 100. Computing this integral we get (m(1) + 100)/2 Expected Score (m(1), m(2)| his first score is less than m(1)) = Pr(his second score is less than m(2)| his first score is less than m(1)) Expected Score (m(1), m(2)| his first score is less than m(1), his second score is less than m(2)) + Pr(his second score is greater than m(2)| his first score is less than m(1)) Expected Score (m(1), m(2)| his first score is less than m(1), his second score is greater than m(2)) = (m(2)/100)(50) + ((100-m(2))/100) ((m(2) + 100)/2) Choose m(1), m(2) to maximize, ((100-m(1))/100) (m(1) + 100)/2 + (m(1)/100) ((m(2)/100)(50) + ((100-m(2))/100) ((m(2) + 100)/2)) Maximizing wrt m(1) and m(2) we get m(1) = 62.5, m(2) = 50
MA Economics
DSE 2014-16 |
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Thanks Sonia!
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In reply to this post by kangkan
the first question, should it not be an inflection point?
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No it should not be point of inflection this is because both the necessary and sufficient conditions are satisfied for the function, at x=1, f'(x)=0 and f''(x)>=0 also the first non zero derivative occurs at 4th derivative which is even ordered derivative hence it passes the even order derivative test too..so it has a optima (minima) at x=1.
"I don't ride side-saddle. I'm as straight as a submarine"
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Thanks!
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In reply to this post by kangkan
Q 35., i seem to be getting the answer as b) equal to the probability that it will end in 7 games. Anyone?
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Thats the correct answer i guess..!!!
"I don't ride side-saddle. I'm as straight as a submarine"
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Hm. I saw it given somewhere as equal probability for 6 or 7 games.
Q 41 and 42? |
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Q 46 and 47., anyone??
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Q 55, 57 and 58 too!
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In reply to this post by rongmon
46) If b> a, then total units of good X available in economy is greater than total units of Y. Now both agents have Min Utility function, so both would like to consume equal amounts of X and Y. Thus, market for X will not clear for any positive price! The only case when it can clear will be when X is available for free. Hence
Option (c) if b>a, Px=0 |
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